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Measures of poverty based on consumption suggest that recent economic
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picture. We present data based on recent re-surveys of Tanzanian households
ﬁrst visited in the early s. These demonstrate a marked increase in prosper-
ity from high levels of poverty. It does not, however, follow that these improve-
ments derive from GDP growth. We consider the implications of this research
for further explorations of the relationship between economic growth and agri-
cultural policy in rural areas.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Rapid economic growth is transforming many African economies
(Radelet ). Sustained high rates of growth (despite downturns
and austerity elsewhere in the world), macro-economic stability, rela-
tively low inﬂation, and growing investment and infrastructural develop-
ment are seeing numerous countries become more prosperous. Some
observers are celebrating a rising continent, that will be known for its
growth, peace and stability (Chuhan-Pole & Angwafo ).
Whether this growth is inclusive and pro-poor is less obvious (Barrett
). The highly visible prosperity in urban areas that characterises
current economic growth can conceal persistent poverty in rural areas.
Indeed, observers fear that some forms of investment may cause more
problems if that investment is accompanied by land loss (Borras et al.
; Benjaminsen & Bryceson ; Fairhead et al. ; Gardner
). Others observe that growth at the national scale is accompanied
by rural differentiation and class formation in villages that maintain sign-
iﬁcant deprivation (Mueller ). Dercon’s call for more longer-term
insights into the fortunes of rural households during periods of growth
remains as relevant as ever (Dercon ).
In this article we explore the relationship between economic growth
and rural poverty in Tanzania. This country presents an apposite case
study, in that it has enjoyed substantial growth in the last  years, yet is
still characterised by high levels of rural poverty. However, understanding
the dynamics of rural poverty is difﬁcult because of the paucity of data
available. Our contention is that by critically examining existing sources,
and by exploring new data, we make it possible to tell more stories
about poverty and prosperity in rural areas in Tanzania. More speciﬁcally,
we make some forms of rural prosperity more visible than they currently
are. We also suggest, however, that it may not be possible to connect this
improved wellbeing to economic growth as measured in GDP.
The new data we examine here concern long-term trends in asset use
and ownership by rural people. Attention to assets is important because
they feature so prominently in local deﬁnitions of wealth and local
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investment strategies. Yet common measures of poverty, and in particular
poverty lines based on basic baskets of consumption, do not include assets.
We proceed as follows. First, we outline the debates surrounding
Tanzania’s growth and its inclusivity – whether or not it has beneﬁtted
the poorer members of Tanzanian society. Second, we critically
examine the data which are used to argue that poverty has not declined.
We then introduce the methods which we used, which entailed revisiting
families who were previously surveyed over  years ago. Fourth, we
present the ﬁndings which show an increase in prosperity according
to local measures of wealth, which hinge on assets. This is intriguing
and we suggest further lines of enquiry that explore its implications in
the discussion and conclusion.
T A N Z A N I A – I N C L U S I V E G R O W T H ?
Many observers are quick to praise Tanzania’ economic success over the
last  years (Edwards ; Adam et al. ). According to Edwards, in
Nyerere’s last years in power, the country was suffering from stagnant
agriculture and manufacturing, productivity in ‘free fall’, and a ‘sky-
rocketing’ trade deﬁcit (Edwards : ). The broad social vision
that drove his policies (such as free universal primary education) were
suffering from a basic absence of state funds. Since then, with reforms
and structural adjustment, the economy has been transformed. Nord
and colleagues summarise the changes as a ‘remarkable turnaround’,
compared to the want and scarcity that characterised the country in
the s. Now there is low inﬂation, a ‘buoyant’ economy which has
averaged % annual growth, real per capita income has risen %
and poverty is ‘heading downwards’ (Nord et al. : ). Robinson
and colleagues describe a period of accelerated growth since 
that has seen macro-economic stability and increased public spending
(Robinson et al. ).
But there is wariness as to whether this growth has been inclusive. In
particular, there is concern that the beneﬁts of growth are not being
experienced by the rural poor. Robinson and colleagues note that agri-
culture has not really contributed to this growth, which is a ‘cause of
concern’ given that agriculture is the economic mainstay of rural
areas where most people, and most of the country’s poor people, live
(Robinson et al. : –).
For the most severe critics, the deprivation in rural areas despite years
of economic growth is particularly damning. Mashindano and collea-
gues compared change in poverty statistics using Household Budget
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Survey (HBS) data with GDP growth data. They conclude that there has
been substantial economic growth, but that this growth has not reached
the poor; if anything it has passed them by (Mashindano et al. :
). The gap is particularly stark after  when GDP growth out-
stripped population growth considerably, but was not matched by a com-
mensurate fall in rural poverty. Edwards, using the same data, notes that
poverty decline has been far slower in Tanzania than in other countries
(Edwards : ). Arndt and colleagues also observe that growth in
GDP from  to , but slow decline in poverty over the same
period, was a conundrum (Arndt et al. ). The indications are that
most households (and particularly most rural households) were not
beneﬁtting from the continued economic growth the country was
experiencing in this period.
The poor performance of agriculture, which has not seen signiﬁcant
increases in productivity, and the consequent inability of smallholders to
become wealthier in appreciable numbers, is particularly sobering. This
appears partly to be due to the low productivity of smallholders in abso-
lute terms – they cannot produce enough to prosper (Jayne et al. ;
Bryngelsson et al. ). Case studies of social change in agrarian
contexts suggest that rural labour markets seems to be fuelling differen-
tiation within villages that beneﬁt only a minority (Mueller ; Greco
).
More detailed analyses of the  HBS data report that there
are signs that agricultural livelihoods are proving particularly unproﬁtable
(Hoogeveen & Ruhinduka ). These analyses suggest that Tanzanians
were diversifying out of agriculture in order to improve their wealth, and
investment in agricultural assets (livestock, ploughs and hoes) declined
between  and . Indeed the analysts go so far as to state that ‘it
is difﬁcult to make a decent living out of agriculture’ (p. ).
More recent HBS analyses, which use an altered method for collect-
ing consumption data and constructing poverty lines, suggest that
there has been a reduction in poverty in recent years (since ),
and that growth has become more inclusive (World Bank ). But
the fact remains that for around two decades since  Tanzania’s
economic growth was not sufﬁciently inclusive, and that rural areas
and most of the population, appeared to be particularly badly off.
Many Tanzanians have only been able to enjoy their country’s
growing prosperity vicariously. Some authors conclude that the import-
ant question to consider now is how and why growth in Tanzania in the
s and s failed to reduce poverty (Mashindano & Shepherd
: ).
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A S S E T S A N D P O V E R T Y
However, before we address Mashindano and Shepherd’s question,
we must take another, closer, look at the data, for when we do so the
story becomes more complicated. There is evidence that, if we consider
rural families’ investment in assets, then the rural economy is more
diverse, and has more potential for prosperity, than it ﬁrst appears.
That proposition is the concern of the present paper.
We believe that assets deserve more careful consideration for three
reasons. First, we show that the data used to construct poverty lines do
not count changes in assets. Second, assets matter a great deal for
rural livelihoods. Third, there is some evidence that exploring change
in assets will capture important dynamics not currently recognised in
poverty line data.
Poverty lines are constructed from HBS data using measures of con-
sumption. They are calculated on the basis of how much money
people spend day-to-day.
The basis for assessing income poverty is a measure of households’ con-
sumption expenditure… This is compared with a poverty line, which repre-
sents the cost of a basic basket of consumption. Households that fall below
the poverty line are poor; individuals are classed as poor if they live in a poor
household. (United Republic of Tanzania : )
However, not all expenditure is included in this measure of household
consumption: ‘the measure used in the poverty analysis excludes large
durable items, which are rare purchases and are not typical of the house-
hold’s usual consumption level’ (United Republic of Tanzania : ).
There are good reasons for this omission. Purchasing an expensive item
in the week of the survey would make a family look wealthy, with weekly
expenditure of hundreds, if not thousands of dollars. These rare items
have to be omitted as outliers. But this means that the method cannot
capture investment in assets. The purchase of a car, motorbike or
house has to be excluded from the ‘basic basket’. Thus a poor family
which has successfully saved and purchased a large durable item (such
as a plough) from which it then earns an income, would appear no
richer in an HBS survey. Similarly a well-endowed family living frugally,
but supporting its children through education, or living in a good house,
would look poor as these forms of expenditure are speciﬁcally excluded:
‘Expenditure on medical care, education, water, telecommunications
and postage are also excluded … Rent and imputed rent were also
excluded because of the poor reporting of the latter’ (United Republic
of Tanzania : ).
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These exclusions present a problem because they omit important
forms of behaviour and expenditure that concern assets (Johnston &
Abreu ). In part they matter because assets can be valuable. For
example the IGAD initiative has re-valued the contribution of livestock
to rural economies in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and the Sudan, increas-
ing their worth by % (over US$ billion). Ofﬁcial ﬁgures typically
dramatically underestimate the value of milk production and manure,
nor do they capture the value of livestock as draught animals, or as a
form of savings and ﬁnancial services (Behnke ; Behnke &
Metaferia ; Behnke & Muthami ; Behnke & Nakirya ;
Behnke & Osman ).
Assets are not just undervalued by states, they are featured signiﬁ-
cantly in local deﬁnitions of wealth and poverty. These deﬁnitions
tend to hinge on ownership of, or at least the ability to use, assets like
land, livestock and small businesses (see Table I). A good life is manifest
in a ﬁne house and furniture more than measures of consumption.
Poverty researchers have frequently observed this phenomenon
(Shaffer a). The ‘Voices of the Poor’ study undertaken by the
World Bank found that assets were particularly important for the
poor’s own understanding of their poverty and desired wealth (reported
in Meinzen-Dick et al. ).
In rural areas assets are a useful means of storing and saving wealth in
agricultural societies where income is lumpy and infrequent because it
depends on harvests. Injections of cash will be targeted at acquiring
assets rather than everyday consumption. This is captured by this focus
group statement:
We get money seasonally. This means for all of us here there are those who
have earned three million shillings, or two million shillings, but if right now
you were to ask one of us here to lend you a small amount of money she
would tell you I haven’t even got a cent [laughter] … if you want to
borrow a million shillings she will give it, but go to them in November
and ask to borrow , to deal with a problem and they will tell you I
have nothing, I have bought a TV, I’ve bought a plot, I’ve bought bricks.
The statement reﬂects a wider literature which shows that a classic
response of households that are becoming wealthier is to invest in
their assets, rather than in, for example, improving their diet and
basic baskets of consumption (see for example Scott ). Assets
provide for the long-term future of households, which is why owning
assets is a good indication of long-term prospects, and selling assets a
sign of impending problems (cf. De Waal ). They make families
more resilient to shocks and problems, and better able to prosper
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T A B L E I .
Wealth stratiﬁcation systems for Tanzania
Wealth
Group
Wealth Group Characteristics
Loiske ()
Wealth Group Characteristics
Higgins and Da Corta ()
 Immensely Rich.
Knows no barriers, has cars, lorries etc.
Rich (tajiri).
Signiﬁcant assets and local power.
Involved in large-scale or employment of labour.
Owns large-scale non-farm assets.
May lend money.
 Very Rich.
Many cattle and much land; owns a tractor but not a lorry. Has
businesses and land in towns.
 Rich.
Employs many vibarua; has many cattle. Has businesses.
 Above Average farmer.
Some cattle; farms their own land and uses vibarua work
occasionally.
Resilient (tajiri kiasi, mwenye uwezo).
Sufﬁcient capacity (e.g. assets, social networks) to prevent signiﬁcant downward mobility relative
to overall productive wealth.
May employ small amounts of labour on the farm or be involved in small-scale trade.
 Average farmer.
A few cattle, farms their own land without using vibarua work.
Vulnerable but not poor (tete ila siyo maskini).
More productive assets which take the family through the year.
During good times can save.
During bad times will reduce family consumption.
Vulnerable to downward mobility with a signiﬁcant shock.
Poor (maskini).
Access to limited productive assets (land and livestock).
Cannot earn enough from farming or trade to take family provisioning through the whole year so will
reduce family food consumption.
Cannot save much in good years.
Must sell assets in order to cope in a crisis.
Vulnerable to downward mobility to ‘very poor’ category but not to ‘destitute’ category.
 Poor
Rents land out to others; depends on casual vibarua work for
daily needs; few if any livestock.
Very Poor (maskini sana).
No clear livelihood source; no signiﬁcant productive assets; dependent on selling labour and/or
scavenging; erratic income and food access; very vulnerable to becoming destitute with shock.
 Extremely poor
Unable to get work easily; hard to rent their land out to others;
suffering from alcoholism and/or illness.
Destitute (maskini hohehahe).
Depends on others for basic needs; Cannot work; tends to be socially excluded.
Vibarua work refers to casual labour.
Source: Loiske (), Higgins & Da Corta (: ).



E
C
O
N
O
M
I
C
G
R
O
W
T
H
,
R
U
R
A
L
A
S
S
E
T
S
A
N
D
P
R
O
S
P
E
R
I
T
Y
&RUHWHUPVRIXVHDYDLODEOHDWKWWSVZZZFDPEULGJHRUJFRUHWHUPVKWWSVGRLRUJ6;
'RZQORDGHGIURPKWWSVZZZFDPEULGJHRUJFRUH8QLYHUVLW\RI6KHIILHOG/LEUDU\RQ0D\DWVXEMHFWWRWKH&DPEULGJH
from good fortune. As Carter & Lybbert () have found in Burkina
Faso, asset wealth can demarcate different forms of behaviour in times of
stress, with wealthier families able to sell assets in order to maintain their
levels of consumption, whereas asset-poor families reduced consump-
tion in order to conserve assets. Not counting assets, as occurs when
poverty lines are constructed, is therefore problematic because it
misses important investments, goals and the meaning of a prosperous
life in many African rural areas.
A ﬁnal reason to look carefully at assets is that there is a body of litera-
ture which suggests they provide insight into important trends, and indi-
cate more prosperity than hitherto realised. Arndt and colleagues found
that indices of education, shelter and water provision had improved in
Tanzania from  (Arndt et al. ). More controversially, Alwyn
Young examined the records of change in assets in the Demographic
and Health Surveys ( surveys across  countries over  years) to
construct asset indices to suggest that there has in fact been an
‘African Growth Miracle’ which is unrecognised by current data based
on consumption (Young ). Young’s work covered only unproduct-
ive assets, but he concluded that material consumption had been rising
at ·– times the rates recognised in other sources (see also Sahn &
Stifel ).
Young’s work has generated considerable controversy. Harttgen et al.
() argue that the continental conclusion is based on inappropriate
extrapolation from prospering countries. Furthermore there may be a
problem of ‘asset drift’, meaning that ‘assets accumulate at the house-
hold level even in the absence of income growth’ (Harttgen et al.
: S). They also observe that there is a poor correlation between
assets and income. These arguments still leave substantial elements of
Young’s thesis intact. If the continental picture is exaggerated it still
could be true for individual countries. Well-being may improve with
asset drift, even if income does not (through, for example, reduced
exposure to risk and unexpected misfortune). Finally, while Harttgen
and colleagues are quite right to complain that assets are poorly corre-
lated with consumption, that does not mean that consumption is the
‘true’ measure of economic performance. What matters more is how
well both measures correlate with prosperity and well-being. That is
harder to determine.
Johnston & Abreu’s () response to Young’s work suggests that
there may well be changes visible through exploring assets, but that
we have to be careful as to the scale of the analysis that we use. They
welcome the improving welfare that Young documented (lower death
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rates, more education as well as more physical assets) and note that ‘it is
clear that the asset data tell us a reliable story about the accumulation of
assets by many people in many African countries’ (p. ). But they
offered a number of important correctives on the use of asset indices.
Assets are used to construct asset indices because it is believed that
assets correlate well with wealth. However, the reasons behind asset
acquisition are multiple, and are not merely determined by wealth.
Asset indices, like those Young constructed, can become particularly
problematic when used for comparison over long time periods, or
large geographic scales.
Yet, if national scale asset indices (and international comparison from
them) are problematic then this point also means that they can be used
with more power locally. Where assets are used to construct local indices
of well-being, wealth and poverty and where they are grounded in local
understandings of the value of assets, they can be revealing. Observing
assets could be a useful means of exploring the variety of stories that
can be told about rural societies and economic growth in diverse
African countries. If assets are an important part of rural livelihoods
then it may be premature to conclude, as Mashindano and others
have done, that economic growth in Tanzania has excluded the poor.
The measure of poverty they were using for their sober assessment did
not look at change in assets.
Taking a critical look at data on economic growth in Tanzania there-
fore presents a problem. On the one hand, the vibrant economic growth
of the last  years appears to have been a restricted urban phenomenon
which is simply not enjoyed by the bulk of the population, the rural poor,
who most need to see some change. On the other hand, the measures
which raise this alarm are in themselves incomplete.
Good panel data, which are so useful in tracking poverty dynamics and
which might be able to tackle this dilemma, are scarce (Baulch &
Hoddinott ; Dercon & Shapiro ; Dercon et al. ; Baulch
). Clearly other data, and methods, are required in order to gain
some insights into livelihood and prosperity dynamics in the rural
economy. That is the challenge which we have tried to take up in this
paper.Wepresentﬁrst themethodweused and then theﬁndings it yielded.
M E T H O D S
We have taken a one-off survey conducted in the early s and turned
it into a longitudinal survey by re-surveying the same households. This
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technique has been used before in the Kagera Health and Development
Survey, which traced over , families in  when seeking to re-
interview  families that had participated in a survey in the early
s (De Weerdt ; Beegle et al. ). It is similar to methods
which ask respondents to reconstruct change over time from the
present (turning survey data ‘upside down’, as described by Dercon &
Shapiro (: )), except that it does not rely on those memories
for its baseline. The baseline is provided by the ﬁrst survey. This gives
it an advantage as recall can suffer from rose-tints and inaccuracy – a
risk, for all its insights, in the ‘stages of progress’ method (Krishna
et al. ; Krishna , ). We rely instead on actual observations
recorded some  years ago.
We have used data from a survey undertaken in Gitting, in Hanang
District, Manyara Region, in north-central Tanzania. This village was
surveyed by Loiske between  and  as part of his PhD (Loiske
). Loiske’s ﬁrst step was to explore the distribution of wealth in
his study area. His unit of analysis was the ‘household’, which was
deﬁned as any homestead registered on the village lists. The categorisa-
tion system of wealth that he used, and its accuracy, is fundamental to
the argument of this paper and it is important to consider it carefully.
Loiske’s informants divided households into seven groups – two poor,
two average and three varieties of wealthy farmer. The criteria they used
are shown in Table I. From this table it should be instantly apparent that
the local classiﬁcation of wealth was fundamentally a measure of use and
ownership of assets, as has been observed elsewhere. Lest this ranking
scheme should now appear dated, we have included for comparison
the criteria used in the work of Higgins & Da Corta (), for research
in the same country. With some differences they match reasonably well.
The importance of assets in local measure of prosperity in rural
Tanzania is enduring.
Loiske established these wealth categories, and the distribution of
households within them, with some rigour. He began by taking a list
of all households in the village which had been allocated land in the vil-
lagisation operation. He then arranged for  separate key informants to
rank these households in order of wealth. All the key informants were
men, aged between  and , and were mostly themselves middle-
ranking farmers;  households were ranked in this way. From this
ranking exercise emerged the seven categories of wealth which are
shown in Table I. Loiske then randomly selected % of the households
of each wealth group (), of which he was able to interview and/or
visit  for his research.
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Brockington revisited the original families in  to explore how live-
lihoods had changed, and what might explain these changes. Of the 
households Loiske surveyed we were able to identify , of which
Brockington visited . This was part of a year of sabbatical research
during which he was based in the neighbouring village of Miaskron.
He conducted his work in part with one of Loiske’s former research
assistants, and with the assistance of a former village executive ofﬁcer,
who was identiﬁed by the village leadership as a useful assistant, and
who was old enough to remember the condition of families when
Loiske was conducting the research. Interviews were conducted in a
mixture of Swahili and Iraqw, which sometimes required translation
into Swahili.
‘Household’ surveys should ring alarm bells among Africanist
researchers who are familiar with longstanding critiques of all that
households can conceal (Guyer ; Moock ). Our reasons for
using this social unit are complex, and discussed at length elsewhere
(Brockington et al. ). Sufﬁce to say here that we hope we do not
use ‘households’ in the cavalier way that has too often characterised
social surveys (Randall et al. ; Randall & Coast ). Rather we
explore the changing fortunes of families because these are the appro-
priate unit of analysis with which to explore trends in assets. Land, live-
stock and homes in Gitting are not individually owned, but the collective
wealth of families. Decisions to sell or rent out any assets are discussed
and fought over. Children’s education is generally supported by a
larger network of relations. It is because we are exploring trends in
assets that we need to talk about households and families. For the
same reason, we do not attempt to explore changes in fortunes per
capita – this would not be socially meaningful in this context. We
realise that this method is limited because it risks obscuring changing
gender dynamics and intergenerational dynamics.
When meeting with villagers we used a mixture of quantitative and
qualitative methods, building on our own experience, and others’
(Lawson et al. ; Adato et al. ; Howe & McKay ; De
Weerdt ; Shaffer b). The quantitative element re-surveyed
households visited earlier, and individuals who have left original house-
holds to set up their own homes. The qualitative included a discussion of
any changes with household members that become apparent in the re-
survey as soon as that survey was completed. In addition we took more
detailed oral histories from a representative sub-sample of households
to explore important events and changes that have taken place in the
intervening years. We took village, crop and economic histories
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(including crop prices) from key informants and district and regional
records to build up a picture of the general changes in the area.
There were two community-level methods that complemented these
tasks. First we undertook a participatory wealth ranking of all households
in the village (conducted with the village executive ofﬁcers, village chairs
and sub-village chairs) in order to compare how wealth distributions now
compare with the past, and to see whether the households we have re-
surveyed are still representative of their broader communities. We
then shared summaries of ﬁndings and changes in public village meet-
ings so that community members could discuss our ﬁndings and offer
improvements or correction to them.
R E S U L T S
Gitting should be a good place to be a farmer; it is well-endowed for agri-
culture. The village is close to Mt Hanang, an extinct volcano some
,m high. Soils are generally fertile, and Gitting sits on the wetter
side of the mountain. It is predominantly composed of the Iraqw
ethnic group whose proclivities for agriculture were commended by
British colonists (Snyder ). Gitting has a slightly unusual history,
in that the British supported a select few families in the village to pur-
chase tractors and other implements in an attempt to create an agricul-
tural yeomanry (Raikes ). This led to some fabulously wealthy
families in the village, farming hundreds of hectares annually (Loiske
). All this land was redistributed in the villagisation operation of
the early s, with every household receiving four acres each.
The most signiﬁcant ﬁnding from Loiske’s research, however, despite
these endowments, were the very high levels of poverty that he reported
(Table II). This table makes for depressing reading: it shows that over
% of households were poor in some way (shaded in dark grey),
meaning that they were either destitute (the single largest category),
or dependent on uncertain and variable day labour for their livelihood.
Indeed it is possible that these levels of poverty are higher than those
found in the HBS nationally in /, for this found less than %
of people were below the basic needs poverty line.
The most important difference our re-survey found from past condi-
tions is that most people seem to be much richer. % of families are
in the average wealth categories (shaded in light grey in Table II).
The destitute are now as rare as the rich, and the poor as a whole con-
stitute just % of people.
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There are three possible scenarios that could explain this change.
First, it is possible that the poor people of  years ago have simply
left the village. Alternatively the poor families could have got richer.
Or there may be a mixture of both factors.
When Brockington revisited the families surveyed by Loiske, he found
that few people had left the village. Those that had gone tended to
belong to richer families whose wealth lay in livestock. They moved to
areas where there was more space for grazing. Instead, the reason why
there are more wealthy families is because people who were poor have
now become richer. This can be seen in Table III, which shows the
same general movement of households out of the poorest categories
(in dark grey) and into the middle categories (in light grey).
But this is not a simple story of greater prosperity for all. The actual
dynamics are more complicated, and these are shown in Table IV.
Here the two columns on the left show where the families were in the
early s, and the columns on the right show where they were at
the time of re-survey. Notice two things about this table. First, it shows
that most families from the poorer families category have become
richer. Those who started off in the poorest categories (,  or )
have tended to move up to richer groups. But notice that the families
which started off in richer categories ,  and , have tended to get
poorer, or stay the same. There are therefore two sets of changes to
explain – why have the richer families got poorer, and why are the
T A B L E I I .
Social stratiﬁcation in Gitting in the s
Wealth Group
s 
No. of H’hlds % of H’hlds No. of H’hlds % of H’hlds
: Immensely Rich  ·  ·
: Very Rich  ·  ·
: Rich  ·  ·
: Above Average  ·  ·
: Average  ·  ·
: Poor  ·  ·
: Very Poor  ·  ·
Total  ,
Source: Loiske () and Participatory ranking exercise with village leaders and executive
ofﬁcers, .
This table compares all residents in the s with all residents in . The difference is
highly signiﬁcant: χ = ·; df = .
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poorer families richer? Both issues were discussed in interviews with fam-
ilies and two village discussion groups.
Focus groups and oral histories suggested several driving forces
behind the decline of the wealthy. Rich families have become poorer
because of illness, because of family troubles (divorce, or the expense
of seeking or maintaining a second wife), through taking to drink or
simply because they are older and have lost their strength. Rich families
appear poorer simply because they are moving through the later stages
of life cycles which see them allocate assets to their children. Some once
richer families are headed by elderly couples who are simply less able to
manage large farms than they were before.
In other cases the decline merely reﬂects the inadequacy of the cat-
egorisation system. Investments in education did not appear in
Loiske’s original scheme. Yet some of the wealthy families in the
village have done just that, investing returns from agriculture, and
selling agricultural assets (livestock, tractors), in order to fund their chil-
dren’s training. This means that they appear to be less wealthy than
before, but they are compensated by their children being employed as
teachers or government ofﬁcers and beneﬁtting from regular salaries
as a result.
With respect to the move out of poverty, four explanations were
offered in focus groups and interviews. The most frequently voiced
was that people have got richer because they have worked hard at
their farming. They have been able to invest in cattle, modern seeds
and farm implements. This work has been more rewarding because
local terms of trade for farm produce has improved. Table V shows
that crops have generally increased their farm gate prices by between
T A B L E I I I .
Change to visited households s– Part 
Wealth Group  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Total  
Source: Loiske () and Brockington’s ﬁeldwork, .
This table compares the condition of the sample visited in the s with its condition in .
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% and % in the last  years. Moreover, as Table VI shows, some
cash crops are now yielding considerably greater returns, relative to
maize, than they were in previous years. Whereas two sacks of beans
used to be able to purchase three of maize, now they can purchase
almost ﬁve. Thus families who farm cash crops have been able to
secure their subsistence needs more easily and, possibly, generate a
surplus. To summarise this point, the villagers we surveyed demon-
strated substantial improvements in prosperity, founded upon retention
of assets, and improved returns to them (due to crop price increases), as
well as growth of assets (herds) and investment in homes and education.
A second cause of poverty that many families reported was alcoholism.
Accordingly poverty has declined as some have been able to stop drink-
ing, or, in other cases, children have taken over the farm from alcoholic
parents (generally fathers) who merely rented their land out each year
for enough money to keep them in drink. Loiske’s work shows that this
was a serious problem in the s. Conversely those poor families who
stayed poor during the years of our survey were often unreformed
alcoholics.
We cannot tell whether alcoholism was the cause or consequence of
poverty. It was probably a mixture of both. We should also note that
alcohol sales are often a means by which women (who make and sell
alcohol) gain access to money which is controlled by men (who are
the main consumers of the drink). Our data do not allow us to
comment on the social dynamics of the relative demise of alcoholism.
T A B L E I V .
Change to visited households s– Part 
Households in s
Wealth distribution in

Original Wealth Group Number of households in each group     
  
     
      
     
     
     
Total      
Source: Loiske () and Brockington’s ﬁeldwork, .
This table compares the status of households visited in the s with their status in .
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The point is simply that fewer families in this survey now suffer as a result
of it than was the case before.
A third possibility that could explain greater prosperity is that local
exploitation of poor families by rich families in the village has decreased.
Loiske’s work and local history makes clear that some of the wealthy
farmers in the s (the yeomanry families that the British had sup-
ported) were able to rent land while paying poor families little money
for it. They controlled the tractors required to plough up large areas
of land, and particularly some of the heavier clay soils which dominated
some families’ farms. Now, however, as more people have ploughs, as
oxen and tractor ownership has broadened, it is harder for the richer
families to dictate terms. Investment in assets has broadened the pro-
ductive base of the village as a whole.
Finally, in a number of ways, some of the tasks that women have under-
taken have become, relatively speaking, easier. There are now readily
accessible diesel-powered mills to grind corn (as opposed to grinding
by hand using stones) and water is more easily available at village stand-
pipes. There are more health clinics, which was reported in the focus
groups to have improved maternal health. All these measures will have
enabled women to put more of their time into more remunerative
work. Infrastructural improvements in their lives may have led to more
productive use of agricultural assets.
D I S C U S S I O N
Our data do not allow us to determine which of the causes of change
described here is most important. Our sample size is not large
T A B L E V .
Average farm gate price in Hanang
Deﬂation
by
Years
averaged Maize Beans Wheat Potatoes Sunﬂowers
Pigeon
Peas
Purchasing – · · · · · ·
Power – · · · · · ·
Parity Increase % % % % % %
Consumer – , , , , , ,
Price – , , , , , ,
Index Increase % % % % % %
Source: Hanang District Council Records.
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enough, nor the measurement of assets precise enough, for that sort of
modelling and correlation. However, the value of this sort of research is
to suggest hypotheses for testing in larger studies, and useful avenues of
enquiry that may be pursued further, as well as suggesting methodo-
logical insights. In that spirit we discuss four challenges that this research
poses.
The ﬁrst challenge is the relationship between rural economies and
national level GDP. What are we to make of the fact that rural prosperity
in Gitting has risen alongside national GDP growth? Does this suggest
that rural economies are well tied to national economic growth?
Could counting assets reveal unrecognised growth?
We feel such speculation is premature. We believe that exploring
assets makes it possible to tell more stories about the nature of economic
and social dynamics in rural areas. But we do not think that the ﬁndings
from Gitting necessarily prove that a rising national GDP has reduced
poverty in this village. That assumes that national GDP ﬁgures and
local incidences of rural prosperity or poverty are well connected in
the ﬁrst place.
It is, however, possible that GDP ﬁgures are only weakly related to live-
lihoods in remote rural areas. We know that GDP has risen as a result
mainly of growth in the manufacturing, mining and service sectors.
Agriculture contributes only % of GDP (World Bank ). Thus,
depending on the composition of GDP growth, it could be misleading
to expect a good relationship between GDP growth and rural livelihoods
if the change in GDP does not derive from agriculture.
We must also recall that the statistics used to estimate agricultural con-
tributions may well be weak and unreliable (cf. Jerven ). They
simply do not capture much of the activity in the informal sector
which dominates life in rural Tanzania. Edwards reports the well-
known case of the drought of late  in Tanzania, the worst for 
T A B L E V I .
Relative price of  kg of maize to  kg of other crops in Hanang
Years averaged Beans Wheat Potatoes Sunﬂower Pigeon peas
– % % % % %
– % % % % %
Source: Hanang District Council Records. Prices have been deﬂated by the Consumer Price
Index (CPI).
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years, in which food crop production is estimated to have declined by
–% in . Nevertheless, government statistics show that agricul-
tural GDP grew by ·% in that year (Edwards : –). Ofﬁcial
ﬁgures for the agricultural component of GDP may not be accurate
enough to explain village-level growth.
Thus it might be possible for the agricultural sector to thrive, and for
the broader economy not to and vice versa. If, in fact, most farmers con-
tribute relatively little to the crop sales measured in GDP calculations
then it is likely that their own livelihood dynamics could be quite separ-
ate from the changes suggested by GDP. As Dercon & Gollin (:
) have observed, poor spatial connectivity can increase the hetero-
geneity of countries’ agricultural sectors and render some areas effect-
ively closed economies.
Viewed thus we should not be surprised that GDP increases seem
poorly reﬂected in the consumption patterns of the rural poor, as
Mashindano and others complain. Nor in fact should we read too
much into the fortunes of Gitting (as measured in assets) appearing to
match those of the nation. Rather than trying to explore the connections
between the two scales of activity (village and nation), we would require
separate sets of explanation for change in each.
The second surprising result from this work is the proposition that
people could have become more prosperous as a result of greater agri-
cultural activity and higher crop prices (shown in Tables V and VI). This
is surprising because most accounts of Tanzanian agriculture emphasise
its low productivity and stasis (Gollin & Goyal ). Investigations
suggest that most rural households are net consumers, not producers,
of food and therefore any increase in crop prices should make most
rural people poorer. Jayne and colleagues have shown that for numer-
ous countries in the region, most agricultural surplus is produced by a
small minority of relatively large farms and prosperous farmers (Jayne
et al. ). We have reproduced their ﬁndings in Table VII and supple-
mented it with Tanzanian data from the Living Standards Measurement
Study (LSMS). The Tanzanian data show the same levels of inequality as
other countries, and suggest the same basic point. Because most rural
households in Tanzania buy more food than they sell, increasing crop
prices should make most families poorer not richer.
Similarly, Bryngelsson and colleagues have expanded Jayne et al.’s
analysis using the  KDHS and by including all foods, and not just
the main staples (Bryngelsson et al. ). They found that % of
the rural population are net buyers of food. Smaller farmers both
produce less, and are often required to sell any surplus when the price
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Distribution of farming activity in selected African countries
Country & Year of Survey Attribute: Mean
Quartiles of land ownership per capita
Lowest quartile Second quartile Third quartile Highest quartile
Kenya
/
Farm Size
Crop Sales ($)
·

·

·

·

Ethiopia

Farm Size
Crop Sales ($)
·
·
·

·

·

Rwanda

Farm Size
Crop Sales ($)
·
·
·
·


·

Mozambique

Farm Size
Crop Sales ($)
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Zambia

Farm Size
Crop Sales ($)
·
·
·
·
·

·

Tanzania
/
Farm Size
Crop Sales ($)
Livestock Sales ($)
·


·


·


·


Source: Jayne et al. () (Table II) and LSMS  data (for Tanzania). Tanzanian data include all households, urban or rural, who farmed land. All sales
ﬁgures have been converted to  US$, using the CPI deﬂator available at < http://www.measuringworth.com>, accessed ...
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is particularly low. Therefore, if this was the case in Gitting, then the
increased prosperity we record in assets will have happened despite
food price increases, not because of them. Higher food prices would
not make the rural poor richer, it would add to their troubles.
But we must be careful with such national-scale generalisations of
rural economies. Analyses of their dynamics must allow for more com-
plexity; as Dercon and Gollin put it, ‘[t]he central fact of agriculture
in sub-Saharan Africa is enormous heterogeneity’ (Dercon & Gollin
: ), and this includes within-country heterogeneity (Dercon &
Gollin : ). Kagera, from where Bryngelsson and colleagues’
data came, is a major coffee growing area, which has a particular
dynamic reﬂecting changes in the coffee economy, and a long-term
decline in coffee prices. In Hanang, which depends on cultivating
wheat, potatoes, maize and beans, there will be a different history.
We also have to factor in livestock, whose economic contributions
have been consistently under-estimated (as in Behnke’s work reported
above). In Tanzania, livestock sales are more important than crop
sales for households with smaller farms (Table VII, bottom row). This
reﬂects the fact that many pastoral families may not cultivate much
land. Their poor crop sales are not a good indication of the returns
they experience from participating in the rural economy. They partici-
pate through selling livestock and milk (Brockington ).
In addition to the complex geography of rural economies, the
dynamics of economies over time will have variable impacts upon
poorer households. Bryngelsson and colleagues argue that while food
price rises in the short term may be harmful to households who
spend most of their money on food, and who are net purchasers of
food, in the longer term the consequences are more complicated.
Higher food prices can lead to higher rural wages and to increased agri-
cultural productivity, such that more families become net producers
not net consumers.
Finally, it is important to consider what variety of foods households
produce and the extent of their dependence on purchased produce.
This variety, the diverse changes in costs of each food relative to
others, and the multiple margins on which consumption can be adjusted
led Dercon & Gollin (: ) to conclude that the welfare implica-
tions of food price changes are very complicated. Bryngelsson and col-
leagues emphasise that households which produce a signiﬁcant
proportion of their own food can beneﬁt from both increasing and
decreasing food prices. They explain this as follows:
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by altering their consumption basket they can… increase their welfare… If
food prices go down, they can shift towards better quality food or more food
consumption at the expense of a relatively small decrease in non-food con-
sumption. If food prices go up, on the other hand, they can similarly shift
towards more non-food consumption at the cost of a relatively small
decrease in food quality or quantity. These new options should increase
their total welfare. (Bryngelsson et al. : )
This point matters because LSMS data for Tanzania show that, with
respect to staples, most families, most of the time, are net producers,
not net buyers of their staple food (Table VIII). Sixty-six per cent of
rural residents in this survey enjoy surpluses almost all year round.
They could belong to those households who produce signiﬁcant propor-
tions of their own food and thus beneﬁt from all food price changes,
both increases and decreases.
It is therefore possible to explain how smallholders could prosper
from small farms and rising food prices. Nevertheless, given the stark-
ness of Jayne and colleagues’ ﬁndings, the prosperity we have recorded
in Gitting remains surprising. Comparative data that would allow us to
compare our ﬁnding with others are few. Our suggestions do not ﬂy
in the face of hundreds of studies because adequate survey data simply
do not exist to provide them. We venture it therefore as a possibility
which requires more investigation.
The third surprise is that asset accumulation seems to have reversed
processes of rural differentiation. Studies from elsewhere in Tanzania
show that wealthy rural families are able to maintain their wealth
through exploitative labour practices, or through using their wealth to
provide political inﬂuence to facilitate land acquisition (Mueller ;
Greco ). Gitting complicates this picture. Exploitative land hiring
arrangements have declined, as have the extremes of inequality that
British support had fostered. In part this may be due to the fact that
we considered a broader bundle of assets than just land. In part it may
be because land was still relatively plentiful and so it was harder for
inequalities to grow and deepen. Unworked land was still cheaply avail-
able during Brockington’s ﬁeldwork within a day’s bicycle ride of
Gitting. Hardworking, but poor, families could thus accumulate assets
through agricultural activity. The class dynamics of Tanzanian villages
are complex. The form and level of inequality that are found will vary
according to the measurements used to determine prosperity and
poverty, the distribution of the means of production, and the accessibil-
ity of the different engines of productivity (land, labour, credit, product-
ive assets).
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T A B L E V I I I .
Net production and purchase of staple through the year
Land quartile J F M A M J J A S O N D % of Rural Ppn
No land −· −· −· −· −· −· −· −· −· −· −· −· 
Lowest −· −· −· −· · · · · · −· −· · 
Second −· · · · · · · · · · · · 
Third · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Richest · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Households visited            
Source: LSMS  data. Table includes all rural households and shows net weight of staple produced (+) or purchased (−) in the week sampled. Shaded
cells indicate net deﬁcit of staple food.
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Finally, there is the question of the gender dynamics of the increasing
prosperity we have recorded. Our study has focused on families and
domestic units, which necessarily obscures the gendered distribution
of beneﬁts within them. Given that most of the domestic units in this
area are led by men, who will ostensibly own many of the assets, in
some respects we have documented most clearly improving male for-
tunes rather than general fortunes. As one anonymous reviewer of this
article commented, ‘some households may have acquired more assets
and improved on them because of the labour and investment of female
members who are not entitled to dispose of them or use them for
collateral’.
There is much truth in that observation, and, at the same time, we
must recognise that male control over these assets is not a given. It is con-
tested, and husbands and fathers can lose those arguments. In some
instances families were able to prosper because (male) children and
their mothers conspired against their fathers to stop them renting out
family land in order to feed a drinking habit. In other instances family
disputes are played out in competing attempts to control assets.
Women, for example, will own and breed pigs, whose sale they
control. Their husbands will try and usurp control of the animals, and
on occasion fail to do so.
Nevertheless, the point remains that if our research has shown the
importance of studying change in assets, then it has also highlighted
the need to explore how rural men and women separately use farm
and off-farm income to invest in assets. The way in which women
invest income in land, improved equipment, livestock and the education
of children is not well described in the literature. This will explain, in
part, why the changing fortunes of some rural families are still hidden
to some researchers, economists and government planners.
C O N C L U S I O N
It is premature to enthusiastically welcome Tanzania’s recent decades of
economic growth if that growth has not included the poor. It is difﬁcult
to see what purpose growth serves if it is not inclusive. Equally, before
condemning its lack of connection to the rural poor, we have to know
how to measure the beneﬁts (or otherwise) that economic growth
might have. Current misgivings about Tanzanian economic growth
excluding the poor have been based primarily on measures of consump-
tion. This is an important aspect of poverty, as it shows in a basic material
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sense that the economic growth the rest of the country enjoys is not well
shared. But nevertheless this measure overlooks change in assets. We
cannot conclude from the stasis in poverty lines that economic growth
is not assisting households to move out of poverty (more broadly
deﬁned).
The ﬁndings from this article suggest that it is important to explore
change in assets, as well as change in consumption, if we are to under-
stand how inclusive economic growth is for the rural poor (cf. Shaffer
a). The families described in this village have experienced a
remarkable change of fortunes in the last  years, as measured by
their assets. Measures of household prosperity which ignore assets will
be unable to capture the sorts of dynamics described in this survey.
The data presented here suggest that determining the inclusivity, or
otherwise, of economic growth in the absence of understanding
trends in assets is premature. Current poverty lines rely solely on con-
sumption indices of a restricted range of goods. But understanding
poverty dynamics during times of economic growth requires incorporat-
ing a notion of the dynamics of asset use and ownership. Rather than
asking why growth is not inclusive (as recommended by Mashindano
& Shepherd ), it is important ﬁrst to ask how change in assets is
related to change in consumption. Unfortunately, the historical data
presented here do not allow us to explore that relationship. That is a
task for ongoing analyses of panel data.
The case is taken from one Tanzanian village, which is well endowed
with agricultural resources and well-placed to beneﬁt from improve-
ments to the agricultural economy. Care is required when extrapolating
from this case study. We are not asserting from this case that most rural
Tanzanians have in fact beneﬁtted from  years of economic growth.
We can, however, suggest that it is possible for many rural Tanzanians
to have beneﬁtted thus. The challenge now is to identify how to
explore long-term trends in rural asset dynamics over the last  years
in rural Tanzania. By extending this technique to other areas of
Tanzania, with different agro-ecological conditions, different histories,
and different afﬁnities to commercial agriculture we could build up a
richer picture of change across the rural economy during a period of
GDP growth. By exploring the dynamics of investment in assets and
changing control over them, we could understand better how changing
asset portfolios contributes to the well-being of men and women differ-
ently. Through such work we hope to contribute to a rich understanding
of the nature and consequences of economic growth to locally meaning-
ful understandings of wealth, poverty and prosperity.
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N O T E S
. The detailed analyses are not all depressing. There is clear evidence that the growth in educa-
tion is very pro-poor, with enrolment of the poorest quintile increasing from % to %
(Hoogeveen & Ruhinduka ).
. It is unfortunately not clear what large durable items have been omitted in the calculations of
poverty lines. The accompanying documentation does not list items, nor does it specify the precise
criteria by which they are included or excluded. We only learn that ‘[o]utliers were identiﬁed
using two criteria: that the actual expenditure per capita on that item/category was high, and that
the budget share of the item was also high for that household. The latter criterion helps ensure
that wealthy households with genuinely high expenditure on a range of items are not mistakenly iden-
tiﬁed as outliers. Outlying expenditure values for a given item were replaced with the mean expend-
iture calculated across all households’ (United Republic of Tanzania : ). An important project
for future research would be to consider precisely what forms of investment in asset, for which sorts of
families, are excluded by poverty line calculations.
. These calculations of the worth of livestock reiterates long-recognised problems with the
modern state’s understandings of the economics of pastoral societies (Behnke ; Behnke &
Scoones ; Homewood ).
. Kilwa Focus Group ...
. Gitting was subsequently split, for administrative purposes, into two contiguous villages named
Gitting and Gocho. For simplicity’s sake we shall simply refer to ‘Gitting’ in the text.
. This household list included all families in the village but omitted itinerant agricultural labourers
from the neighbouring region of Singida who were given temporary accommodation on farms. The
omission is important because it means that this survey and its long-term ﬁndings are no guide to
the changing fortune of itinerant labourers. It is a guide to the fortunes of land-owning farmers.
. These prices and terms of trade have not been altered by reduced transportation costs due to
road improvements. Road links to the main towns of Babati and Arusha have been generally
unchanged for the period under study, half being paved, and the other half unmetalled. The
tarmac road between Arusha and Singida (which passes near Gitting) was only completed in .
. The consumption data in the LSMS survey are collected for only one week. We have taken that
weekly consumption to be typical of the month from which it was collected.
. The task of locating suitable surveys, from which longitudinal panel data could be recon-
structed, has already begun in a project funded by the ESRC and DfID. For more information see
<http://livelihoodchangeta.wixsite.com/tanzania/project-summary>.
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